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Abstract
We oﬀer a formal framework that enables the analysis of the fascinating phenomenon
whereby individuals who “live in diﬀerent worlds” agree to a shared course of action. We
deﬁne the notion of a course of action which, unlike a (behavioral) strategy proﬁle, does
not require a complete speciﬁcation of actions in every contingency. We introduce a new
solution concept: a mutually acceptable course of action (MACA). Loosely speaking, an
MACA consists of actions that “make sense” in every player’s (perception of the) game, and
every player takes into account that all players are rational. In particular, an MACA can
be viewed as an (incomplete) contract or a social norm that free rational individuals would
be willing to follow for their own diverse reasons. We show that by varying the degree of
completeness of the underlying course of action, the concept of an MACA can be related to
many of the commonly used solution concepts, such as perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, (rationalizable) self-conﬁrming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes. Thus,
our framework also serves to unify “game-theoretic” and “incomplete contracts” viewpoints.
(JEL: C72)
∗Greenberg: Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, H3A 2T7; Gupta: University
of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 48109; Luo: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei
115, Taiwan, ROC.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
We oﬀer a way to formally analyze the fascinating phenomenon whereby individuals who “live
in diﬀerent worlds” agree to follow a common course of action. The problem of analyzing shared
action among individuals has attracted the attention of sociologists, psychologists, political
scientists, and organizational theorists for a long time. While there are diﬀerences in focus
between diﬀerent research streams, the underlying problem is the same: why, and when, do
rational actors choose to follow a common course of action? Central to this question is the
notion of diﬀerences in actors’ perceptions of the situation; their values, beliefs, and views of the
world. There is ample evidence that several political and military situations are best analyzed as
diﬀerent games viewed by diﬀerent players. For example, Snyder (1979) and Boudon (1981) argue
that during the ﬁrst world war, Germany believed that the game being played was a prisoner’s
dilemma type game while Britain believed that the game being played was a coordination type
game. Other examples include the German occupation of France in 1940, the Allied invasion of
Normandy in 1944, and the Middle East war of 1973 (see Section 5.1.2 for a discussion). Finally,
the fact that resources are devoted to diversion and deception1 demonstrates that countries,
politicians, military generals, and other economic agents realize that diﬀerent players may (be
induced to) analyze diﬀerent games.
And, there is a rich tradition of the idea of “diﬀerent worlds” in literature, a few examples
here being: Moliere’s and Shakespeare’s “comedies of errors” where the identities of “players” are
misperceived; Akatagawa’s (1952) “In a wood” (or, its well-known movie version, “Rashomon”,
by Kurosawa) where players’ perceptions of an event they witness diﬀer drastically; and Canetti’s
(1946) “Auto-Da-Fe”,2 where there is no ambiguity concerning the perceptions of the (“physi-
cal”) identities or actions that are actually being taken, but individuals attribute very diﬀerent
1See Crawford (2003) and Hendricks and McAfee (2003) for several such examples of feints, or ‘strategic
misrepresentation’, from oil drilling to ex-President George Bush’s famous 1988 campaign promise: “Read my
lips: no new taxes”.
2The novel was published in German as “Die Blendung” (The Deception) in 1935; the ﬁrst US version appeared
under the title “The Tower of Babel” in 1947.
1motivation and interpretations to the actions the other players take.
At ﬁr s tg l a n c e ,t h en o t i o nt h a td i ﬀerent individuals may perceive a given situation as
diﬀerent games may seem like a radical change from “classical” game theory. However, it turns
out that our framework facilitates formal representation of “mainstream” arguments as well,
including those concerning the most fundamental notions in game theory: the Minmax theorem
and the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, von Neumann and Morgenstern themselves used the idea of
worlds apart to justify the minmax value in a two-person zero-sum game. They associated with
such a game two auxiliary games: the majorant game and the minorant game, which correspond
to each player assuming that he moves ﬁrst, and his choice is observed by the other player.
Thus, each player is analyzing a diﬀerent (perfect information extensive form) game, where each
player sees himself as the “leader” and the other player as the “follower” (see Section 5 for a
formal discussion).
Indeed, the rules of the game prescribe that each player must make his choice (his
personal move) in ignorance of the outcome of the choice of his adversary. It is
nevertheless conceivable that one of the players, say 2, “ﬁnds out” his adversary;
i.e., that he has somehow acquired the knowledge as to what his adversary’s strategy
is. The basis for this knowledge does not concern us; it may (but need not) be
experience from previous plays. At any rate we assume that the player 2 possesses
this knowledge. ... Under these assumptions we may then say that player 2 has
“found out” his adversary. [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947, p. 105.]
More recently, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) interpreted a Nash equilibrium as
players’ choices when each player knows his own payoﬀ functions and strategy choices of the
other players. As they write (ibid, p. 1161): “Suppose that each player is rational, knows his
own payoﬀ function, and knows the strategy choices of the others. Then the players’ choices
constitute a Nash equilibrium in the game being played.” As in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
interpretation of the minmax value, this argument also implicitly suggests that diﬀerent players
2perceive and analyze diﬀerent games.1
There are, however, several fundamental diﬃculties in formally applying traditional game-
theoretic analysis to situations with divergent perceptions, as such analysis almost always as-
sumes that the players play the same game. That is, following Harsanyi (1967-68), each player is
assumed to be (at least probabilistically) aware of all the available actions and payoﬀso fa l lt h e
other players, and this information as well as the structure of the game is common knowledge.
In particular, all players consider the same “states of Nature”. This assumption prevents the
analysis of situations where diﬀerent players may perceive diﬀerent games.
Even when the game is common knowledge, there are two additional limitations of most
of the existing models in game theory that we seek to relax. First, most equilibrium solution
concepts usually employed in applications impose (diﬀerent degrees of) a stringent requirement:
commonality of beliefs among players regarding other players’ actions, including actions in the
“oﬀ-equilibrium” contingencies (that are not supposed to arise if the equilibrium contract is
followed). Second, in the most commonly used equilibrium notions (such as perfect or sequential
equilibrium) players are required, in addition to agreeing on the precise actions to be taken in
every contingency (whether or not it arises), to also agree on the precise way in which players
might deviate (or commit mistakes - known as “trembles”) from these speciﬁed actions. Many
game theorists have pointed out the problems with these assumptions (e.g., see Kreps, 1990;
Rubinstein, 1991).
In sum, our analysis of shared action with divergent perceptions enables us to extend the
literature by oﬀering a framework for studying the following situations: a) when players perceive
diﬀerent games; b) when the game is common knowledge but players’ beliefs may diﬀer oﬀ the
equilibrium path; and, c) when the game is common knowledge and the actions to be taken in
every contingency are agreed upon, but players may not necessarily have the same beliefs on
how other players might “tremble” (or make mistakes).
1To be sure, no formal framework is presented by these authors that could accommodate players playing
diﬀerent games.
3We carry out our analysis using the notion of a “course of action (CA)” which, unlike a
strategy proﬁle, does not require a complete contingent speciﬁcation of actions in all information
sets. Informally, a course of action is a speciﬁcation of (possibly probabilistic, or mixed) actions
to be taken in some, but not necessarily all, contingencies. A course of action can be interpreted
as a social norm or an incomplete contract. A contract (or agreement) may be incomplete in the
sense that it does not specify actions in all possible contingencies, and it may be partial in the
sense that players may agree to take certain actions towards resolution of a situation, without
actually fully resolving it. Such partial and incomplete contracts form a large part of everyday
human interactions that form the basis of many social and economic phenomena. However, the
solution concept (“equilibrium”) employed in most game-theoretic analyses is a strategy proﬁle,
which, by deﬁnition, provides a complete speciﬁcation of actions in all possible contingencies.
Thus, the existing models in game theory are not easily amenable to the analysis of incomplete
contracts.
Our solution concept, a mutually acceptable course of action (MACA) is, loosely speaking,
a course of action that “makes sense” in every player’s (perception of the) game. That is, a
course of action is mutually acceptable if no player would wish, in his own world, to deviate from
it. When deciding on whether or not to deviate from a course of action, every player takes into
account that all players are “rational”. In making their decisions, each player analyzes possible
consequences of deviations from the proposed course of action. Players would be willing to
conform to a proposed course of action as long as their conformity does not conﬂict with rational
behavior. Observe that each player may rationalize his expectations in a diﬀerent way, as long
as this does not violate the common knowledge of rationality as perceived by each player.
In the “classical” case where all players play the same game, and this is common knowledge,
we relate our solution concept to several equilibrium notions frequently used in game-theoretic
analysis and applications, by exploring the implications of diﬀerent degrees of completeness of
the mutually acceptable course of action. Speciﬁcally, we show that when the underlying course
of action is “complete” (i.e., speciﬁes an action in all possible contingencies), the MACA lies
“in-between” perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1971) and perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg
4and Tirole, 1991). This is true even in the special cases of normal form3 games, and in games
with perfect information.
I ft h ec o u r s eo fa c t i o ns p e c i ﬁes a “path”, that is, leaves out contingencies if someone
deviates from the speciﬁed actions, the MACA reﬁnes self-conﬁrming (Fudenberg and Levine,
1993) and rationalizable self-conﬁrming equilibria (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine, 1998, 2002).
If the course of action is completely silent, that is, does not specify any actions at any
nodes, the MACA reﬁnes rationalizable outcomes in normal form games (Bernheim, 1984;
Pearce, 1984). For extensive form games, the notion of a null MACA provides a new and
attractive (see Example 4.3.2) deﬁnition of rationalizability.
As one application of our general framework, we can interpret our results in the language
of contract theory. As noted earlier, a course of action can be seen as a proposed incomplete
contract that does not specify parties’ obligations in all contingencies. An MACA can be viewed
as an incomplete contract that rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own
(possibly diverse) reasons. As a large body of literature in contract theory has argued, rarely,
if ever, does a contract specify actions in all possible contingencies (e.g., see Williamson, 1985;
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988). Most of this literature sees contractual
incompleteness as resulting from “unforeseen contingencies”, bounded rationality, or certain
“transaction costs” that make it impossible to have a complete contingent contract describing
the terms in each possible state of nature. Thus, there is an implication that loss of contractual
completeness causes some loss of eﬃciency, that is, all parties could be better oﬀ if a complete
contract were possible. One exception to this literature is a recent paper by Bernheim and
Whinston (1998) who show that, in presence of non-veriﬁable parameters, making a contract
more incomplete can lead to better outcomes even in the absence of any costs of writing (and
enforcing) contracts. We obtain a similar (and stronger) result, that an incomplete MACA
may Pareto-dominate any complete MACA. However, our motivation and framework are very
diﬀerent (see Example 2.1 and the discussion there).
3Some readers may prefer the term ‘simultaneous-move’ games.
5We will formalize these ideas and demonstrate their usefulness in the rest of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. For ease of exposition, and to facilitate comparison with
existing game-theoretic notions, we present most of our analysis in the classical case where all
players face the same game which is assumed to be common knowledge. We start in Section 2
with two examples to illustrate the main ideas. Section 3 lays out the basic notation and the key
deﬁnitions of a CA and an MACA, and examines some basic properties of an MACA. Section 4
shows how an MACA is related to some of the commonly used equilibrium concepts (deﬁnitions
of these concepts are summarized in Appendix 1). Section 5 extends this analysis to the case
where players live in diﬀerent worlds. Appendix 2 contains all the proofs.
2E x a m p l e s
To demonstrate the main ideas, we present two simple examples before a formal analysis. Here,
we restrict ourselves to the classical case where the game is common knowledge. The ﬁrst
example illustrates that an incomplete contract can Pareto dominate every complete contract
even in a game of perfect information.
Example 2.1: Consider the perfect information game depicted in Figure 2.1. Player 1 (an
entrepreneur) has to decide whether to sell the ﬁrm (action L1) or to delegate control to his
son (player 2). Player 2 can then decide to manage the ﬁrm himself (action L2)o rh i r ep l a y e r
3 (CEO) to run the business. The CEO, in turn, may or may not delegate control to player 4
(a subordinate, a manager, or a team of managers represented as a single player). The manager
can, then, either exert eﬀort to manage the business well (action L4), or shirk (action R4).
Assume that the game, actions, and resulting payoﬀs as depicted in Figure 2.1 are all common
knowledge.4
4Please note that payoﬀs here are given in utils, so any penalties for the manager for shirking are accounted













There are two subgame perfect equilibria of this game: (L1,R 2,R 3,L 4)a n d( L1,R 2,L 3,R 4).
Both of them support the action L1whereby the entrepreneur sells the ﬁrm. The unique subgame
perfect equilibrium payoﬀ is (1,1,1,-1).
However, we shall now argue that players can do better through an incomplete contract
that does not specify the actions players 3 and 4 are to take at their respective information
sets. Consider the (incomplete) course of action x =( R1,L 2) (i.e., the CA speciﬁes that the
entrepreneur would delegate control to his son, who chooses not to delegate further). Note
that x is not a strategy proﬁle as it does not specify an action for each player in all possible
contingencies. We show (somewhat informally, for now) that x constitutes a mutually acceptable
course of action (MACA); that is, all players will rationally choose to abide by this course of
action. Observe that this CA generates the payoﬀ (2,2,2,0), which Pareto dominates the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ (1,1,1,-1).
The reasoning is as follows. If player 4’s information set is reached, it is rational for player
4t oc h o o s ee i t h e rL4 or R4 as he is indiﬀerent between the two. Since the CA (R1,L 2)d o e s
not specify an action for player 4, player 3 can rationally choose L3 (if he believes that 4 will
7shirk and choose R4)o rR3 (if he believes 4 will work hard). Thus, player 2, contemplating
a deviation from the CA (R1,L 2), can reasonably expect that 3 might choose R3 and that 4
might choose R4. Therefore, player 2 will be willing to follow x and hence player 1 will also
be willing to follow x.N o t et h a ti ti so n l yb e c a u s et h eC Ax is incomplete that it is mutually
acceptable; no course of action that speciﬁes “rational actions” for the players in all information
sets can support the CA x. In particular, no subgame perfect equilibrium supports the path
(R1,L 2) because any such equilibrium requires that all players have the same beliefs regarding
other players’ actions (including those at nodes that are precluded from being reached if the
equilibrium is followed). In contrast, (R1,L 2) is an MACA because players 2 and 3 need not
have (or, may not be aware that both, do in fact have) the same beliefs regarding player 4’s
behavior if he is delegated control of the ﬁrm.
This example highlights the important observation that the requirement that all play-
ers have the same beliefs regarding other players’ behavior is constraining and may preclude
reasonable, in fact, more plausible, predictions in many applications. Observe that incomplete
contracts arise here even in absence of indescribable contingencies and transaction costs.
This example also illustrates that incomplete contracts may lead to better outcomes than
those achievable through complete contracts. That is, ambiguity about actions at some in-
formation sets may yield Pareto-dominating payoﬀs. This is in sharp contrast to most of the
literature on contract theory, a notable exception being the recent paper by Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1998). They show that a less complete contract may Pareto dominate a more complete
contract; thus, more contractual ambiguity may be beneﬁcial, in agreement with our argument
above. However, in their model (which diﬀers from ours) a “complete” contract cannot be Pareto
improved. The optimality of incomplete contracts in their setting is conditional on the presence
of non-veriﬁable parameters that cannot be speciﬁed in any contract.
The next example illustrates how incomplete contracts can arise in a game of imperfect
information. The basic insight from Example 2.1 carries over: some (or all) of the players may
beneﬁt by leaving their choice of actions ambiguous in some information sets.
8Example 2.2: 5Consider the imperfect information game depicted in Figure 2.2, which may
represent the following diplomatic “peace-negotiation” scenario. Each of the two warring coun-
tries, 1 and 2, has to decide whether or not to reach a peace agreement, represented by the
path (R1,R 2). If the countries fail to reach an agreement, country 3 would “re-evaluate” its
policy, a decision that would aﬀect both countries 1 and 2. Assume that country 3 has no way
to know which of the two countries caused the breakup of the negotiations (otherwise, it could
threaten to retaliate against that country). All it observes is whether or not the negotiations
were successful. As the payoﬀs in Figure 2.2 indicate, it is in the best interest of country 3 that
the two warring countries sign the peace agreement. This game has a unique (mixed strategy)
Nash equilibrium given by: Player 1 uses the mixed strategy (1
2 L1, 1
2 R1), player 2 uses the pure
strategy L2, and player 3 uses the mixed strategy (1
2 L3, 1
2 R3). Player 3’s Nash equilibrium















We shall now argue that player 3 may expect a payoﬀ of 4 by not specifying the action
he might take (if information set h were to be reached). That is, the (incomplete) agreement
5This example also appears in Greenberg (2000).
9x =( R1,R 2) is an MACA: both players 1 and 2 will choose to follow this course of action.
Indeed, player 1 as well as player 2 may fear that in the event of a deviation from x (i.e.,
breakdown of negotiations), player 3 will retaliate against him.6 Thus, the path (R1,R 2)w i l l
be followed because x does not specify player 3’s action. This outcome could not be supported
in any contract that speciﬁed player 3’s action, or alternatively, if players 1 and 2 shared the
same beliefs about 3’s action and this was common knowledge.
We now formalize these ideas in the next sections.
3 M A C Ai naC o m m o nW o r l d
We start with the classical case where all players face the same game (possibly with imperfect
information), which is assumed to be with perfect recall and common knowledge. We denote
the game by T =( N,V,H,{A(h)}h∈H ,
©
uiª
i∈N), where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players,
V is the set of nodes (or vertices), H is the set of information sets, A(h) is the set of pure
actions available at information set h,a n dui is player i’s payoﬀ function. For simplicity, we
shall assume that the set of vertices is ﬁnite.
A mixed action at information set h is a probability distribution over the pure actions in
A(h). We denote the set of mixed actions at h by ∆(h), and the set of information sets belonging
to player i by Hi. A behavioral strategy for player i is a function that assigns to every h ∈ Hi
a mixed action from ∆(h).7 The set of strategies of player i is denoted by Yi,a n dt h es e to f
strategy proﬁl e si sd e n o t e db yY (i.e., Y = ×i∈NYi). For y ∈ Y,w ed e n o t eb yy(h)t h em i x e d
action of y at h and by y(−h) the proﬁle of mixed actions of y at all information sets other than
h.F o r y ∈ Y, ui(y)d e n o t e si’s (expected) payoﬀ if y is followed from the root of the game.
6Player 1 will not deviate from x and choose action L1 s i n c eh em i g h tf e a rt h a tp l a y e r3m i g h tb e l i e v et h a th e
is at vertex v1 and therefore may choose action L3, yielding player 1 the payoﬀ of 0. Similarly, player 2 will not
deviate from x and choose action L2 fearing that player 3 might believe that he is at vertex v2 and therefore may
choose action R3, yielding player 2 the payoﬀ of 0.
7Throughout this paper, we will use the term strategy to mean behavioral strategy.
10We can now formalize the basic building blocks in our analysis: the notion of a course of
action and the conditions under which it will be mutually acceptable to all players.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A course of action (CA) is a mapping x : H →∪ h∈H∆(h) ∪ {∅},w i t hx(h) ∈
∆(h) ∪ {∅} for all h ∈ H.
Thus, a course of action may or may not specify a mixed action at an information set.
The interpretation of x(h)=∅ is that the CA x does not specify which action from ∆(h)p l a y e r
i would take at h,w h e r eh ∈ Hi; otherwise, x(h)s p e c i ﬁes player i’s (mixed) action at h.I n
particular, a CA x is said to be complete if x(h) 6= ∅ for all h ∈ H. A complete CA is therefore
as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle.
The central question with which we are concerned here is: which course of action would
be followed by free rational individuals? Keeping with the noncooperative approach, a course of
action will be followed if no single player has an incentive to deviate from it. Such a course of
action will be called “mutually acceptable” (we abbreviate it as MACA). Informally, an MACA
is a CA x such that following x is always optimal for every player, who is aware that, like himself,
all other players are “rational”. We ﬁrst elaborate on the criterion of rationality.
As is customary, we impose the rationality criterion through the requirement that actions
chosen by a player be best responses to his beliefs about opponents’ actions. In order to ensure
that players’ actions are optimal in every contingency, including contingencies that might not
actually arise, we follow Selten’s (1975) idea of “trembles”. Speciﬁcally, each player i associates








strategies8 that converges to yj.L e t y
j
k Ã yj denote such a sequence. A strategy yi ∈ Yi is
player i’s perfect best response to y−i ∈ Y−i if actions speciﬁed by yi remain optimal for i along
the trembling sequences.
In most cases, however, player i does not know (or does not have a degenerate point-
expectation about) the precise strategy yj that player j might adopt. Rather, i is likely to
8A totally mixed strategy for a player assigns strictly positive probability to every action at every information
s e to ft h a tp l a y e r .
11have a set of strategies, Y j ⊆ Yj that i believes j might adopt. In that case, i assigns some
probability distribution over Y j. By Claim 0 in Appendix 2, for any distribution over Y j,
there exists an outcome equivalent distribution over Y j that has a ﬁnite support (i.e., these two
distributions yield, for any y−j ∈ Y−j, the same distribution over the terminal nodes). That is,
player i believes that player j will choose y
j
t ∈ Y j with probability λt, t =1 ,2,...,m. Recall
that perfection requires that player i associates y
j




t.T h u s , λ is







of totally mixed strategies of player j such that the
kth element, y
j
k, along this sequence is outcome-equivalent to choosing y
j
t,k with probability λt,




Ã yj such a sequence with a limit of yj. (Observe that when




Ã yj if and only if y
j
k Ã yj.) Our rationality criterion
requires that every action chosen by a player be optimal along these “trembling” sequences. More
speciﬁcally, we require that for a strategy yi ∈ Y i of player i,t h e r ee x i s tyi





for all j 6= i such that, for all h ∈ Hi,a n df o ra l lk =1 ,2,..., ui(y(h),y k (−h)) ≥ ui(a,yk (−h))
for all a ∈ ∆(h).
We can now deﬁne our main solution concept: a “mutually acceptable course of action”.
As noted earlier, a mutually acceptable course of action is a course of action that rational
individuals agree to follow for their own, possibly diﬀerent reasons. Players would be willing to
conform to a proposed course of action as long as their conformity does not conﬂict with rational
behavior.
Deﬁnition 3.2 AC Ax is a mutually acceptable course of action (MACA) if there exists a set
of strategy proﬁles Y ≡ Y 1 × Y 2 ···×Y n that supports x. That is, for every player i and
every yi ∈ Y i there exist yi




Ã yj for all j 6= i such that
(i) for all h ∈ H, y(h)=x(h) whenever x(h) 6= ∅,a n d
(ii) for all h ∈ Hi and for all k =1 ,2,..., ui(y(h),y k (−h)) ≥ ui(a,yk (−h)) for all
a ∈ ∆(h).
Remarks: (1) Observe that the chosen sequence {yk}
∞
k=1 in Deﬁnition 3.2 depends on player
12i, because each player can rationalize his choice of yi ∈ Y i using his beliefs, y−i,a b o u tt h e
strategies that the other players might employ. When needed, we shall emphasize this fact by
denoting this sequence as {yk [i]}
∞
k=1.
(2) Deﬁnition 3.2 requires that all players “support” an MACA x by the same set of strategy
proﬁles, Y ⊆ Y. One could justify this assumption by the fact that as the game T and the
rationality of the players are common knowledge, every inference player i can make about player
j’s plausible choices, can also be made by any other player. However, given our focus on
divergent beliefs, we stress here that the above deﬁnition would not change even if we allow
diﬀerent players to support x with diﬀerent sets of strategy proﬁles.9
Before we explore some special cases of interest for our solution concept and its relation
to existing game-theoretic notions, we present two important properties that will be useful in
understanding and establishing our results. First, an intuitively appealing property of an MACA
is that it is not supported by strictly dominated strategies. Moreover, in the case of normal
form games, an MACA is not supported by weakly dominated strategies.
Claim 3.3 Suppose Y supports an MACA in a game T. Then, for each player i, yi ∈ Y i is not
a strictly dominated strategy. Moreover, if T is a game where each player has only one
information set (in particular, if T represents a normal form game), then yi ∈ Y i is not
a weakly dominated strategy.
The second property below states that acceptability cannot be lost by making the course of
action less complete. That is, the more stringent a contract is, the less likely it is to be accepted.
It is ambiguity that gives people hope; shared action is made possible by lack of speciﬁcation
of actions that one or more players are likely to take at some information sets in the game, as
s h o w ni ne x a m p l e s2 . 1 - 2 . 2 .F o r m a l l y ,
9To see this, observe that if for every j ∈ N there exits a set Y [j]t h a ts u p p o r t sx, then the (single) set
Y ≡ ×i∈N ∪j∈N Y
i [j]a l s os u p p o r t sx. This is a special case of a more general result (Theorem 3.4) in Greenberg,
Monderer, and Shitovitz (1996).
13Claim 3.4 Let x be an MACA, and let y b eaC As u c ht h a ty(h)=x(h) whenever y(h) 6= ∅.
Then, y is an MACA.
4 Applications in a Common World
We now explore the concept of a course of action in greater detail by looking at a few special cases.
Our objective here is to demonstrate the generality of the notion of an MACA, its relationship
to existing equilibrium notions, and its potential usefulness in a wide range of applications. We
show in this section that a number of diﬀerent equilibria often employed in applications can be
better understood as variants of our equilibrium notion, depending on the degree of completeness
of the acceptable course of action. Recall that an MACA may range from specifying an action
in all contingencies, to being completely silent, representing diﬀerent degrees of contractual
completeness. In particular, an MACA need not even specify an entire path. Indeed, we often
witness partial agreements where players agree to take some actions towards a resolution, without
agreeing on the “ﬁnal outcome”.10 Similarly, contracts may be incomplete to diﬀerent degrees:
some may specify consequences for most, but not all, deviations from the proposed equilibrium,
w h i l eo t h e r sm a yn o ts p e c i f ya n ys u c hc o n s e q u ences. Our framework can easily accommodate
such variations. We restrict our analysis here to three special cases:
(i) a complete MACA – a course of action that speciﬁes actions in all possible contingen-
cies; this represents a complete contingent contract or agreement. A complete CA is a strategy
proﬁle.
(ii) a path MACA – a course of action that speciﬁes an action at the root of the game
and at every information set that is reached with positive probability if the CA is followed.
This is a typical representation of an incomplete contract where no contingencies are covered if
10This is a common feature of most political agreements, like the Dayton accord, the Israeli-Palestenian accord
of 1996, arms treaties like Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. At most, participants in such treaties hope for some
actions towards an intended outcome, but the ‘terminal nodes’ are far from certain. The same is true in most
ongoing (business or personal) relationships.
14someone deviates from the speciﬁed contract.
(iii) a null MACA – which does not pin down any actions at any information set; players
can only rely on deductions they can make from the common knowledge of the game and
rationality of all the players to anticipate how the game will play out.
4.1 Complete MACA
A course of action x is complete if x(h) 6= ∅ for all h ∈ H. That is, players specify an action
in every possible contingency they may face. This assumption is the building block of most
game-theoretic analysis, based on the notion of a strategy proﬁl e ,w h i c h ,a sw eh a v ea r g u e d
earlier, is quite restrictive. Nevertheless, we proceed in this subsection with the assumption of
a complete course of action, while retaining our focus on divergent perceptions within the same
game that is common knowledge. We will show that even though players agree on a “complete
contract”, they may do so for their own reasons (or beliefs). Since we believe this to be a widely
prevalent characteristic of human interactions, our framework and solution concept may provide
a better way of modeling some situations.
Our ﬁrst result asserts that a complete contract is an MACA if and only if it is “self
supporting”. However, while all players believe that the complete MACA will be followed, it
may be impossible for the players to believe in the same sequence of trembles that converge to
this MACA. (See Example 4.1.4 below.)
Claim 4.1.1 The CA x is a complete MACA if and only if it is supported by the set Y ≡ {x}.
The following Claim oﬀers an alternative deﬁnition for a complete MACA, and also illus-
trates the fact that we allow for divergent beliefs.
Claim 4.1.2 As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle x is a complete MACA if and only if for each player i there
exists a sequence yk[i] Ã x such that, for all h ∈ Hi and for k =1 ,2,...,
ui(x(h),y k[i](−h)) ≥ ui(a,yk[i](−h)) for all a ∈ ∆(h).
15Most applications of dynamic games, such as mechanism design and signaling games, use
some variants of perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975). We shall show that the set of complete
MACA is “in-between” the sets of perfect equilibria and of perfect Bayesian equilibria (Fu-
denberg and Tirole, 1991).11 As every totally mixed Bayesian perfect equilibrium is a perfect
equilibrium, it follows that the only diﬀerence between these three notions (perfect, Bayesian
perfect, and complete MACA) lies in the way players may reason in information sets that are
not reached. We will elaborate on these diﬀerences below.
Our ﬁrst result establishes the formal relationship between a complete MACA and perfect
equilibrium.
Claim 4.1.3 Every perfect equilibrium is a complete MACA.
Example 4.1.4 below demonstrates that, in general, a complete MACA need not be a
perfect equilibrium. This is because of the more stringent requirement imposed by the deﬁnition
of a perfect equilibrium that all the players must have the same beliefs at all information sets
not only concerning the actions that will be taken there, but also on the way these information
sets were reached. While commonality of beliefs along the equilibrium path can be justiﬁed (e.g.,
“past observations”), this requirement is not realistic for information sets oﬀ the equilibrium
path, as noted by others as well (e.g., see Kreps 1990, p.166). That is, for shared action to
take place, players have to agree on what that action is going to be, but not necessarily on the
trembles that resulted in an information set being reached oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Example 4.1.4: Consider the game depicted in Figure 4.1.4.






































Deﬁne the complete CA x by: x(v∗)=E, x(h)=L2,a n dx(h0)=R3. We shall now show
that x is an MACA but it is not a perfect equilibrium. It is easy to verify that the condition
in Claim 4.1.2 is satisﬁed for the following sequences {yk[i]}
∞
k=1 and, hence, x is an MACA. For





























































Observe that the sequence {yk[2]}
∞
k=1 implies that player 2 believes that if player 1 deviates
from E, then it is more likely that player 1 would choose R1. Sequence {yk[3]}
∞
k=1 implies that
player 3 believes that if player 1 deviates from E,t h e ni ti sm o r el i k e l yt h a tp l a y e r1w o u l d
choose L1. But perfect (or sequential) equilibrium does not allow for such divergent beliefs
about trembles; all players must hold the same beliefs about the way an information set was
reached. In our example, for player 2 to choose L2 it must be the case that 2 believes that
12Here, for example, (1 − 1/k)L2 +( 1 /k)R2 m e a n st h a tp l a y e r2c h o o s e sa c t i o nL2 with probability (1 − 1/k)
and action R2 with probability 1/k.
17player 1 would tremble in such a way that the probability of R1 is not lower than 3/4, but with
these same beliefs player 3 would be better oﬀ choosing L3.T h u s ,x is an MACA but it is not
a perfect (or sequential) equilibrium.
Note that the MACA x in the above example is not totally mixed. (The probability with
which player 1 will use either L1 or R1 is 0, and it is this fact that allows the players to hold
diﬀerent beliefs about the trembles, even though the MACA is complete.) For a totally mixed
complete MACA, the following holds:
Claim 4.1.5 A totally mixed complete CA is an MACA if and only if it is a perfect equilibrium.
Next, we relate a complete MACA to perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Claim 4.1.6 Every complete MACA is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.13
Claims 4.1.3 and 4.1.6 together imply that a complete MACA lies “in-between” perfect and
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In general, the set of perfect equilibria may be a strict subset of
the set of complete MACAs which, in turn, may be a strict subset of the set of perfect Bayesian
equilibria. Example 4.1.4 demonstrates the validity of the ﬁrst part of this assertion. To see the
second part, consider the case of normal form games. Note that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
coincides with a Nash equilibrium; hence, it may involve weakly dominated strategies. However,
by Claim 3.3, a complete MACA never employs weakly dominated strategies in normal form
games. Thus, a complete MACA provides a useful reﬁnement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The same is true for games with perfect information: the set of complete MACAs may be
a strict subset of the set of subgame perfect equilibria and may strictly include the set of Perfect
equilibria. The weak inclusions are implied by Claims 4.1.2 and 4.1.6. To realize the possibility
of the strict inclusions, consider the following two examples.
Example 4.1.7: In the game depicted in Figure 4.1.7, the strategy (r1,r 2) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. However, the strategy r1 is weakly dominated, for player 1, by the strategy l1.
13See Deﬁn i t i o nA 1 . 2 ;t h er e s u l tw o u l dh o l de v e ni fw ea d dt h er e q u i r e m e n ti nt h ed e ﬁnition of PBE that Bayes’
rule is used ‘wherever possible’.
18Hence, by Claim 3.3, the action r1 can never be part of an MACA. Indeed, if player 1 assigns
any trembles to player 2, his unique best response is l1.T h e r e f o r e , ( r1,r 2) is not a complete
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Example 4.1.8: The game depicted in Figure 4.1.8 shows that a complete MACA need not be
a perfect equilibrium. Indeed, consider the strategy proﬁle y =( c1,c 2,c 3,c 4) in this game. We
claim that y is not a perfect equilibrium, but it is a complete MACA. To see the ﬁrst point,
assume in negation that y is a perfect equilibrium, supported by a sequence {yk} of totally
mixed strategies. Let pk(a) denote the probability of playing an action a under yk.F o r c2 to
be player 2’s local best response to yk i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tpk(s3) ≥ pk(s4). But then, as
pk(s2) > 0, it follows that player 1’s unique local best response to yk at the root of the game is
action s1, and not c1.T h u s ,y cannot be a perfect equilibrium.
To realize that y is a complete MACA, by Claim 4.1.2 we need to show that for each
player i, there exists a sequence {yk[i]} such that i’s actions in y =( c1,c 2,c 3,c 4)a r eh i sl o c a l
best response to this sequence. For player 1, let {yk[1]} be such that pk(s2)+pk(s3) ≤ pk(s4),
and for player 2 let {yk[2]} be such that pk(s3) ≥ pk(s4). Then, {yk[1]} and {yk[2]} satisfy the
inequality in Claim 4.1.2; therefore, y is a complete MACA.
194.2 Path MACA
Ap a t hM A C Ai saC Ax that speciﬁes a (mixed) action at the root of the game and at every
information set that is reached with positive probability if x is followed. That is, unlike a
strategy proﬁle, a path MACA does not specify actions in all contingencies.
In general, a path MACA need not be derived from a Nash equilibrium, as was illustrated
in Example 2.2. Nor is the converse true, not even in normal form games. To realize this
assertion, note that a path MACA in a normal form game is a complete MACA. Let x be a
Nash equilibrium in a normal form game that involves weakly dominated strategies. Assume,
in negation, that x is a path MACA. By Claim 4.1.1, it is supported by Y ≡ {x}.B u tt h e n ,b y
Claim 3.3, x cannot involve weakly dominated strategies. Thus, x cannot be a path MACA.
However, as we will now show, every path MACA that satisﬁes the “unique deviator”
property can be derived from a Nash equilibrium. For a CA x,d e n o t eb yH(x)t h es e to f
information sets that are reached (with positive probability) if x is followed.14
Deﬁnition 4.2.1 (Unique Deviator Property) A path CA, x,h a st h eu n i q u ed e v i a t o rp r o p e r t y
if for each h/ ∈ H(x) there is a unique player i(h) such that no deviation from x by any
other player j 6= i(h) can result in reaching h. That is, if h/ ∈ H(x),t h e nh/ ∈ H(y) for
any strategy y such that y(h0)=x(h0) for all h0 ∈ H(x) ∩ Hi(h).
Note that every path CA x in a game with perfect information, as well as in any normal
form game, has the unique deviator property. Games with this property (i.e., where every path
in the game has a unique deviator) are called games with observed deviator property (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1993). To realize the diﬀerence between these notions, consider an extensive form
game where a player has two choices at the root of the game: action L ends the game, and action
R l e a d st oap r o p e rs u b g a m eT0 which does not have the observed deviator property. Clearly, T
does not have the observed deviator property, but the path {L} does have the unique deviator
14An information set h is said to be reachable from an information set h
0 if there is a vertex v in h such that
the path connecting the root of the game with v passes through a vertex w in h
0.
20property. We then have the following result.
Claim 4.2.2 Suppose that a path MACA x satisﬁes the unique deviator property. Then, there
exists a (behavioral) Nash equilibrium y,s u c ht h a ty(h)=x(h) for all h ∈ H(x).
To realize that the unique deviator property is necessary for the validity of this claim, recall
Example 2.2 in Section 2. In the game depicted in Figure 2.2, (R1,R 2) is a path MACA since
it is supported by Y ≡ {R1}×{ R2}×{ L3,R 3}. This path does not have the unique deviator
property because both players 1 and 2 can deviate from it and reach player 3’s information set.
The path MACA (R1,R 2) is not supported by (the unique) Nash equilibrium in this game.
A path MACA is also related to some of the solution concepts in the literature on “learn-
ing” (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Fudenberg and Kreps, 1995; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993).
These notions are motivated by the fact that in repeated interactions among players, as players
play equilibrium strategies, “oﬀ equilibrium choices” are not observed, and hence the require-
ment of commonality of beliefs about the actions that would have been taken in contingencies
that were not realized during the play cannot be justiﬁed. Clearly, what players observe are
actions taken along the equilibrium path of the play, and thus observed choices constitute a path
CA. It turns out that viewed in this manner, a path MACA reﬁnes the notion of self-conﬁrming
equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) because an MACA requires that players’ conjectures
about their opponents be rational also “oﬀ the equilibrium path” (see Deﬁnition 3.2). Recall
that in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium (SCE), players learn only the path of play and their beliefs
at information sets that are not reached can be arbitrary. Thus, a path MACA rules out many
unreasonable outcomes. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (1999) recently oﬀered a reﬁnement of
SCE, which they call a “rationalizable self-conﬁrming equilibrium” (RSCE). As the following
claim asserts, our notion of a path MACA reﬁnes both concepts.
Claim 4.2.3 Let x be a path MACA supported by the set Y . Then, every y ∈ Y is a rational-
izable self-conﬁrming equilibrium (and, hence, a self-conﬁrming equilibrium).
We now provide two examples that show that path MACA strictly reﬁnes the set of
21rationalizable self-conﬁrming equilibria. The reason is that we impose more stringent rationality
restrictions on the players’ reasonings. The ﬁrst example, taken from Dekel, Fudenberg, and
Levine (1999) is shown in Figure 4.2.4. As they correctly claim, outcome d1 can arise from an
RSCE in this game. However, d1 is not a path MACA because this game has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium, (r1,r 2,r 3), and thus this path is the unique path MACA. Example 4.1.7
is another demonstration of the fact that a path MACA provides a strict reﬁnement of RSCE.
Indeed, as we argued above, the unique path MACA in this game is (l1,r 2), the path (r1,r 2)i s















The null CA, i.e., the CA x where x(h)=∅ for every information set h ∈ H, is the “coarsest”
type of CA. This CA is suitable for analyzing situations where players do not communicate
and have no common background (based on, say, past observations or social norms) that would
imply an (implicit) agreement concerning the actions to be taken in some information sets. That
is, players have no pre-conception about the course of action that might/should be taken, other
than the one they can, individually and separately, deduce from the game. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the null MACA turns out to be closely related to the notion of “rationalizable
strategy proﬁles”, due to Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Recall that in a normal form
game, a rationalizable strategy for a player is one that is a best response to some beliefs he might
have about his opponents’ strategies, and beliefs are determined from the common knowledge of
rationality (i.e., a player expects his opponents to also play only those strategies that are best
22responses to some beliefs they might have, and so on; see Appendix 1 for a formal deﬁnition).
The null MACA therefore yields a rather intuitive reﬁnement of (normal-form) rationalizability;
in particular, an MACA, by Claim 3.3, excludes weakly dominated strategies.
Claim 4.3.1 Suppose Y supports a null MACA. Then, every strategy proﬁle in Y is (normal-
form) rationalizable.
For general extensive form games, there is no single accepted deﬁnition of rationalizability.
The notion of a null MACA oﬀers a new deﬁnition for this case, which, as the following example
demonstrates, is quite attractive.
Example 4.3.2: Consider the game in Figure 4.3.2. In this game, the null MACA is supported
by the set Y = {(l1,(l2,r 2))}. Hence, the only outcome of this game, in the absence of any
contract, is the path l1. This outcome is appealing because the strategy l1 weakly dominates
r1. (Hence, by Claim 3.3, r1 cannot belong to any set that supports an MACA.) In contrast,
the well-known notions of normal-form and extensive-form rationalizability have no predictive













15There are other solution concepts that yield, in this example, the same outcomes as the null MACA; e.g.,
Asheim and Perea’s (2003) “quasi-perfect rationalizability” and Dekel and Fudenberg’s (1990) “permissibility”.
235W o r l d s A p a r t
We have seen so far how our framework helps analyze situations with incompletely speciﬁed
courses of action that rational individuals may choose to follow for their own diverse reasons
when the game being analyzed is common knowledge. We show in this section that our analysis
can be easily extended to the more general case where players do not perceive the same game.
(Like the proverbial set of blind men touching an elephant, each sees it diﬀerently, and believes
that the way he sees it is the way the elephant is. Or like witnesses to an accident, each tells a
complete story, but tells a diﬀerent one. And, what other interpretation is there for “men are
from Mars and women are from Venus”?)
The requirement that the “structure of the game” or the “model under discussion” be
common knowledge seems to have been an integral part of game and economic theory. Yet, recent
developments have started to doubt whether this is too strong an assumption, and whether a
more plausible analysis could do with less. For example, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995; p.
1176-77) state the following regarding earlier assertions in the literature that common knowledge
of the game or the model being analyzed is required for any economic analysis: “... This seemed
sound when written, but in light of recent developments... it no longer does..... There is nothing
about the real world that must be commonly known among the players.”
As discussed in the Introduction, the situation where players live in diﬀerent worlds cannot
be described (hence, analyzed) by a single game that is common knowledge. Keeping within
traditional noncooperative game theory, we formalize a single player’s perception of a situation
as Harsanyi’s (1967-68) “types model” game, i.e., an (extensive form) game iT.16 Typically, the
game iT is a game with imperfect information. This game incorporates all of i’s beliefs about
the other players. We do not assume that player i is certain about the “types” of the players
he is facing. Rather, he may well be uncertain about some of the parameters (including the
strategy spaces and the payoﬀ functions of the other players) of the game he is (or thinks he is)
16We use
iT rather than T
i in order to stress the fact that
iT is not a restriction or projection of some underlying
game T.
24playing. Thus, iT completely describes player i’s world.
Society, then, consists of n players, given by the set N = {1,2,...,n} and n games
{1T,2 T,..., n T}. It is important to note that these n games may be very diﬀerent; they need
not even have the same structure. The classical paradigm where all players face a single game
T that is common knowledge is obtained, in our framework, as a special case by imposing the
(often unrealistic) restriction that for all i,j ∈ N, iT = jT = T. We analyzed this special case
in the previous sections.
The generality of the notion of a course of action and of an MACA introduced in Deﬁ-
nitions 3.1 and 3.2 allows us to straightforwardly extend the analysis to societies with diverse
perceptions. The only modiﬁcation that has to be introduced is that choices prescribed by a
course of action must be “unambiguously interpretable” in all the n games.
Deﬁnition 5.1 x is a course of action (CA) in society {1T,2 T,..., n T} if it is a CA in every
game iT, i ∈ N. A course of action x is mutually acceptable (MACA) in {1T,2 T,..., n T}
if x is an MACA in every iT, i ∈ N.
While Deﬁnition 5.1 is a straightforward extension of Deﬁnition 3.2, note that it allows
for a wide range of divergent views of the world to be modeled and analyzed. In particular,
there is no limitation on the structure of diﬀerent games iT: these games could be very diﬀerent
depending on the extent to which norms, beliefs, and values are shared among diﬀerent players.
All that is required for shared action is that rational individuals follow that course of action for
their own reasons (because it “makes sense” to them in their own world).
5.1 Applications in Diﬀerent Worlds
5.1.1 Minmax Value
As stated in the Introduction, the notion that players may not analyze the same game is implicit
in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) justiﬁcation of the minmax value in a two-person
25zero-sum game, as well as in Aumann and Brandenburger’s (1995) defense of Nash equilibrium.
We formally relate the minmax theorem to our framework below.
Let G be a two-person zero-sum game; ∆i and Ui,i=1 ,2, are player i’s (mixed) strategy
sets and payoﬀs functions, respectively. Consider von Neumann and Morgenstern’s argument,
that player i assumes that player j 6= i will somehow acquire the knowledge as to what player
i’s strategy is (see quote in Introduction). This implies in our framework that each player i
analyzes the perfect information extensive form game iT, where player i moves at the root of
the game, followed by player j 6= i who observes i’s choice. Thus, players i and j see diﬀerent
games. For such games, the following result shows that every possible anticipation of player i,
i =1 ,2, as to how the game might evolve results in i employing a Minmax strategy. Hence the
outcome will be a Minmax play.
Claim 5.1.1 Let Y support an MACA in iT, i =1 ,2.T h e n , yi ∈ Y i is player i’s Minmax
strategy in the game G.17
The converse of Claim 5.1.1 does not hold. The reason is, again, that perfection imposes
stricter conditions than Nash equilibrium. To realize this point, consider the two person zero-
sum game in Figure 5.1.2(a), which is obtained by slightly modifying the game in Example
4.1.7. Observe that both (U,L)a n d( D,L) are Minmax (or Nash) equilibria. However, player



































17Observe that the strategy set of player i in
iT is ∆
i.T h a ti s ,i nt h eg a m e
iT,w e h a v e t h a t Y
i =∆
i.
26Figures 5.1.2(b) and 5.1.2(c) depict respectively the games 1T and 2T associated with
the normal form game in Figure 5.1.2(a). In game 1T, player 1 moves ﬁrst, followed by player
2’s move. The only choice by player 1 that can be supported in an MACA in game 1T is D.
Indeed, player 1’s only best response if player 2 trembles is the strategy D,t h u si fY supports
an MACA in 1T,t h e ne v e r yy ∈ Y yields the path (D,L).
5.1.2 Military and Political Games
Examples abound in military conﬂicts and international politics where players perceived diﬀerent
games, and such situations readily lend themselves to formal analysis within our framework.
During the second world war, the “Fall of France” to German army in 1940 is widely seen as a
result of the Allied forces’ inability to correctly perceive the likely German attack through the
Ardennes. As discussed in several accounts of the war,18 the Allied forces saw two possibilities
for German attack on France: along the eastern border of France (the Maginot line), or an attack
in the north through Belgium. In particular, the possibility of an attack through the Ardennes
was rejected by the Allied forces as the Ardennes terrain was widely considered by the French to
be unsuitable for tanks. German plans initially shared the French perceptions, and saw a long,
costly encounter and a possible stalemate if the attack were carried out through Belgium or
the Maginot line, as the Germans expected Allied forces to vigorously defend those two fronts.
Being aware that Allied plans had rejected Ardennes as a possibility, Germans assigned a large
force to attack through Ardennes and caught the Allied forces by surprise, leading to a quick
victory for the German army.
Four years later, the Allied invasion of Normandy succeeded, and led to the end of the
second World War, largely due to the successful attempts by the Allied forces to convince the
Germans that the attack was to occur at Calais (see recent game-theoretic analyses of the
Normandy invasion by Hendricks and McAfee, 2003, and Crawford, 2003) . In the Allied view,
Calais was used as a ‘feint’ (complete with a mythical army group of 50 divisions, fake camps,
18See, e.g., Bennett and Dando (1979).
27plywood airplanes and inﬂatable tanks) to mislead the German army as to the true site of the
invasion. Germans believed Normandy was a feint, and that the true invasion was to come at
Calais; so strong was this belief that the Germans directed all back-up forces to Calais and did not
realize the main attack was occurring at Normandy until several days after the D-Day. Hendricks
and McAfee (2003) analyze this situation, and the general incentive to feint, in a two-person
signaling model. Crawford (2003) extends their model to include the possibility that players
may be boundedly rational by assuming, in the context of a two-person matching pennies game,
that players’ types (‘sophisticated’ or ‘mortal’) are drawn from independent common knowledge
distributions, and the game structure as well as payoﬀs are common knowledge.
Our framework oﬀers a more general approach to study such situations. The “Fall of
France” can be easily analyzed as diﬀerent games viewed by France and Germany. This applies
as well to the Normandy invasion, and similar economic situations where an ‘attacker’ has an
incentive to feint and mislead the ‘defender’. Another example, analyzed below, is the 1973
Middle East war.
Example 5.1.3: On October 6, 1973, Egypt attacked Israel, to Israel’s complete surprise.19
Since the 1967 war, Israel’s military and almost all top Israeli oﬃcials had strongly held the be-
lief that Egypt lacked the requisite military and air strength to launch an oﬀensive against Israel,
thus any movements of the Egyptian troops were viewed as ‘routine manoeuvres’ rather than
preparations for war. With this belief, Israel chose not to mobilize its troops, since mobilization
was costly. The Egyptian plans, on the other hand, sought to disguise its troop movements as
manoeuvers, and set a target date of October 1st to see whether Israel mobilized its troops in
response. If Israel mobilized, the plan was to convert troop movements to normal manoeuvers.
The games viewed by Israel and Egypt can be represented as in Figures 5.1.3(a) and (b), re-
spectively. Note that these games have diﬀerent structures, reﬂecting the fact that Israel was
unaware of the October 1st deadline. (The ﬁrst payoﬀ in the games below is for Egypt, second
for Israel.)
19Our example follows Said and Hartley’s (1982) description, who presented a game-theoretic view of the war.



































In the game viewed by Israel (IsraelT), it is a dominant strategy for Egypt not to go to
war, hence, by Claim 3.3, the null MACA in this game predicts (manoeuvers, not mobilize).
In Egypt’s game (EgyptT), however, Egypt would attack unless Israel mobilizes before October
1st. Any strategy involving the choice (not mobilize) in Egypt’s ﬁrst information set is strictly
dominated, so, by Claim 3.3, cannot be part of any MACA. Therefore, looking at the two games,
we would expect Israel to not mobilize, and Egypt to mobilize and then go to war, as indeed
was the case.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we oﬀered a framework to analyze situations where rational individuals with
divergent perceptions agree to follow a common course of action. A course of action need not
specify players’ actions in all possible contingencies, and can be interpreted as a social norm or
an incomplete contract. Players agree to a course of action if it makes sense to them in their
own perceptions of the situation. Following traditional non-cooperative game theory, we ﬁrst
analyzed situations where all players perceive the same game, which is common knowledge. We
showed that many diﬀerent equilibrium concepts employed in economic analysis can be derived
29from our solution concept, a mutually acceptable course of action, by varying the degree to
which the course of action speciﬁes actions in various contingencies. In this setting, incomplete
contracts emerge as rational responses by individuals with diﬀerent beliefs and views of the
world (or on the ‘mistakes’ other players may make), even without considering any transaction
costs. Thus, our framework also serves to unify “game-theoretic” and “incomplete contracts”
viewpoints. We then showed that the framework can easily be extended to situations where
t h ep l a y e r sm a yh a v ev e r yd i ﬀerent perceptions of the game they think they are playing. Our
analysis provides one useful way of studying such situations which, we believe, are common in
reality, as was demonstrated by the few examples of military conﬂicts and political games. Many
other economic and social phenomena could be studied within our framework.
30A Appendix 1: Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition A1.1 A perfect equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle y with the property that there exists
yk Ã y such that, for every player i, for all h ∈ Hi,f o rk =1 ,2,...,
ui(y(h),y k (−h)) ≥ ui(a,yk (−h)) for all a ∈ ∆(h).
Deﬁnition A1.2 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle y with the property that
for each player i and each information set h ∈ Hi, there exists a distribution d(h) over
the vertices in h such that: (i) the restriction of yi to information sets that succeed h is
i’s best response to the restriction of y−i to these information sets, using d(h),a n d( i i )f o r
any reachable information set h when y is followed, d(h) is derived from y using Bayes’
rule.
Deﬁnition A1.3 As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle y is a rationalizable self-conﬁrming equilibrium (RSCE) if
there exists a collection of subsets of strategies
©
Y iª
i∈N such that, for every player i and
every zi ∈ Y i, there exists a strategy zj in the “extensive-form convex hull”20 of Y j (where
j 6= i) such that
1. z has the same distribution over terminal nodes induced by y,a n d
2. for all information sets h ∈ Hi that are not precluded by zi,t h er e s t r i c t i o no fzi to
information sets that succeed h is i’s best response to the restriction of z−i to these
information sets, using the “sequential consistent” (w.r.t. z) distribution d(h) over
the vertices in h.
Deﬁnition A1.4 A collection of subsets of strategies
©
Y iª
i∈N is (normal-form) rationaliz-
able if for every player i and every yi ∈ Y i, yi i sab e s tr e s p o n s et os o m ep r o ﬁle in
20A behavioral strategy y
j is in the extensive-form convex hull of Y








t, and a sequence λk → λ of probability distributions on [1,...,m], such
that the strategies y
j




m,k with weights λ1,k,.....,λm,k converge
to y







denotes the set of all strategies yj ∈ Y j such that yj is outcome-
equivalent21 to a distribution over Y j.
BA p p e n d i x 2 : P r o o f s











the set of all strategies yj ∈ Yj such that yj is outcome-equivalent to a [ﬁnite-support]















Then, yj is outcome-equivalent to a distribution µ over Y j.L e t ψj be the mixed strategy








| yj ∈ Y jª




m i x e dr e p r e s e n t a t i o no fyj.22 Since ϕ : Y j → ϕ
¡
Y j¢
is 1-1, by Kuhn’s (1953) theorem and
Pearce’s (1984) Lemma 2, it is easy to see that ψj is outcome-equivalent to yj. By using Pearce’s









, λt ≥ 0( t =1 ,2,...,m), and
Pm









. Again by Kuhn’s (1953) theorem, yj is outcome-equivalent to the
ﬁnite-support distribution λ over Y j. Q.E.D.
Claim 3.3 Suppose Y supports an MACA in a game T. Then, for each player i, yi ∈ Y i is not
a strictly dominated strategy. Moreover, if T is a game where each player has only one
information set (in particular, if T represents a normal form game), then yi ∈ Y i is not
a weakly dominated strategy.
Proof: For yi ∈ Y i let yi




Ã yj (where j 6= i) satisfy the conditions in Deﬁnition
3.2. By condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 3.2 and continuity of ui,
ui(y(h),y(−h)) ≥ ui(a,y (−h)) for all a ∈ ∆(h).
21As t r a t e g yy
j ∈ Y
j is outcome-equivalent t oas t r a t e g yz
j ∈ Y
j if for any y
−j ∈ Y
−j the strategy proﬁles
(y
j,y
−j)a n d( z
j,y
−j) yield the same distribution over the terminal nodes.




of a strategy y
j is the mixed strategy which assigns to a pure
strategy s
j the product of all the probabilities assigned by y
j t ot h ep u r ea c t i o n st h a td e ﬁne s
j.
32By the one deviation property,23 yi is i’s best response to y−i.T h u s ,yi is not a strictly dominated
strategy.
Now, consider a game T where every player has only one information set. By condition
(ii) in Deﬁnition 3.2, yi is i’s best response to y−i
k . As for all j 6= i, y
j
k is a totally mixed strategy,
it follows that yi is not a weakly dominated strategy. Q.E.D.
Claim 3.4 Let x be an MACA, and let y b eaC As u c ht h a ty(h)=x(h) whenever y(h) 6= ∅.
Then, y is an MACA.
Proof: Since x is an MACA, there exists a set Y that supports x. Then, this Y also supports
y. Q.E.D.
Claim 4.1.1 The CA x is a complete MACA if and only if it is supported by the set Y ≡ {x}.
Proof: Let Y support the complete MACA, x.F o ryi ∈ Y i let yi





j 6= i) satisfy the conditions in Deﬁnition 3.2. Since x is complete, condition (i) implies that
yi
k Ã xi.T h e r e f o r e ,f o re v e r yp l a y e ri and every yi ∈ Y i, yi = xi. Hence, Y = {x}. Q.E.D.
Claim 4.1.2 As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle x is a complete MACA if and only if for each player i there
exists a sequence yk[i] Ã x such that, for all h ∈ Hi and for k =1 ,2,...,
ui(x(h),y k[i](−h)) ≥ ui(a,yk[i](−h)) for all a ∈ ∆(h).
Proof: By Claim 4.1.1 we have that x is a complete MACA if and only if it is supported by the
set Y = {x}.B yD e ﬁnition 3.2, therefore, x is a complete MACA if and only if for each player
23Let y be a behavioral strategy proﬁle. According to the one deviation property (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein
1994, pp. 98-99), yi is a best response to y−i if the player i has no information set h at which a local change in
y(h) (holding the remainder of y ﬁxed) increases his expected payoﬀ.
33i there exists a “trembling” sequence {yk[i]}
∞
k=1 such that (by condition (i)) yk[i] Ã x,a n d( b y
condition (ii)), for all h ∈ Hi and for k =1 ,2,...,
ui(x(h),y k[i](−h)) ≥ ui(a,yk[i](−h)) for all a∈ ∆(h). Q.E.D.
Claim 4.1.3 Every perfect equilibrium is a complete MACA.
Proof: Let y be a perfect equilibrium. Then (see Deﬁnition A1.1) Y = {y} supports y.T h u s ,
y is a complete MACA. Q.E.D.
Claim 4.1.5 A totally mixed complete CA is an MACA if and only if it is a perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Let x be a totally mixed complete MACA. By Claim 4.1.1, it suﬃces to show x is a
perfect equilibrium. By Claim 4.1.2 and the continuity of ui we have that for all players i and
for all h ∈ Hi,
ui(x(h),x(−h)) ≥ ui(a,x(−h)) for all a ∈ ∆(h).
Since x is a totally mixed strategy, the sequence yk ≡ x, k =1 ,2,.., can be chosen as the
trembling sequence for every player i.H e n c e ,x is a perfect equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Claim 4.1.6 Every complete MACA is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof: Let x be a complete MACA. By Claim 4.1.2, for each player i, there exists a sequence
yk[i] Ã x.D e ﬁne the distribution, di(h), over the vertices in an information set h ∈ Hi as follows:
di(h) ≡ limk→∞ di
k(h), where di
k(h) is the unique distribution over these vertices derived from
yk [i] using Bayes’ rule. By condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 3.2 and the one deviation property, it
therefore follows that player i’s strategy xi is a sequential best response to x−i when i’s beliefs
over the vertices in h ∈ Hi are given by di(h). Hence, x is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
34Claim 4.2.2 Suppose that a path MACA x satisﬁes the unique deviator property. Then, there
exists a (behavioral) Nash equilibrium y,s u c ht h a ty(h)=x(h) for all h ∈ H(x).
Proof: For each player i,l e tyk [i] Ã y[i] satisfy the conditions in Deﬁnition 3.2. Deﬁne the





x(h), if h ∈ H(x)
y[i(h)](h), if h/ ∈ H(x)
.
By the unique deviator property, y is well deﬁned. Condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 implies that
y is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies. Q.E.D.
Claim 4.2.3 Let x b eap a t hM A C As u p p o r t e db yt h es e tY . Then, every y ∈ Y is a rational-
izable self-conﬁrming equilibrium (and, hence, a self-conﬁrming equilibrium).
Proof: Let Y support a path MACA, x,a n dl e tyi ∈ Y i. Then, there exists a sequence
yk[i] Ã y that satisﬁes the conditions in Deﬁnition 3.2. By condition (i) in Deﬁnition 3.2,
the path generated by y coincides with x. Moreover, player i’s strategy yi is a sequential best
response to y−i when i’s beliefs over the vertices in h ∈ Hi are given by di(h) ≡ limk→∞ di
k(h),
where di
k(h) is the unique distribution over these vertices derived from yk [i] using Bayes’ rule
(see proof of Claim 4.1.6). Therefore, for all information sets h ∈ Hi that are not precluded by
yi, the restriction of yi to information sets that succeed h is i’s best response to the restriction
of y−i to these information sets, using the “sequential consistent” distribution d(h)o v e rt h e
vertices in h.
To conclude the proof we have to show that for all j 6= i, yj lies in the “extensive-form
convex hull” of Y j as deﬁned by Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2002) (see Appendix 1). Indeed,




Ã yj. That is, there exist {y
j




t (t =1 ,2,...,m)
such that the behavioral strategies y
j





with (the constant) weights λ1,.....,λm converge to yj. Hence y is a rationalizable self-conﬁrming
equilibrium. Q.E.D.
35Claim 4.3.1 Suppose Y supports a null MACA. Then, every strategy proﬁle in Y is (normal-
form) rationalizable.
Proof: Fix a player i, for any yi ∈ Y i let yi




Ã yj (where j 6= i) satisfy conditions
in Deﬁnition 3.2. By condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 and the continuity of ui, ui(y(h),y(−h)) ≥
ui(a,y (−h)) for all h ∈ Hi and for all a ∈ ∆(h). By the one deviation property and Claim 0,




Claim 5.1.1 Let Y support the null MACA in iT, i =1 ,2.T h e n ,yi ∈ Y i is player i’s Minmax
strategy in the game G.
Proof: Consider the game 1T.F o r y2 ∈ Y 2 let yk Ã y satisfy the conditions in Deﬁni-
tion 3.2. By condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2, we have that y(h) is player 2’s best (mixed)
action at every h ∈ H2. Because the game is zero-sum, we have that for any y1 ∈ Y1,
u1(y1,y2)=Minb∈∆2U1(y1,b). It therefore follows that for every y2 ∈ ∆(Y 2)a n df o ra n y
y1 ∈ Y1, u1(y1,y2)=Minb∈∆2U1(y1,b).
Consider now y1 ∈ Y 1 and let yk Ã y satisfy the conditions in Deﬁnition 3.2. By condition
(ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2, we have that at the root of 1T player 1’s choice of the (mixed) action, y1,
is player 1’s best response to y2.T h a ti s ,y1 satisﬁes: u1(y1,y2)=Maxy1∈Y1u1(y1,y2). Since
y2 ∈ ∆(Y 2), by our derivation above, we have that u1(y1,y2)=Maxy1∈Y1Minb∈∆2U1(y1,b)=
Maxa∈∆1Minb∈∆2U1(a,b), i.e., y1 is a Minmax strategy in G.
An analogous argument establishes that in the game 2T, y2 is a Minmax strategy in G.
Q.E.D.
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